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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of institutional actions from the standpoint of cognitive science. The notion of con-
stitutive rules have been proposed to describe the conceptual nature of institutions. In this paper it is extended to cover specific processes
of ‘recognition’ that provide the agents with additional artificial powers. The power of doing an institutional action is considered as a
special kind of artificial power. It is argued that institutional actions achieve their effects thanks to a cognitive and behavioral mediation
of a collective of agents. Individual actions are seen and treated as (count as) institutional actions by the involved participants even if, in
fact, institutional actions are collective actions. When human behavior becomes institutionalized, it acquires special conventional powers
to bring about effects in the social world. A model of such conventional empowerment of an agent is proposed and is identified in a sort
of collective permission. Finally it is argued that institutions are a specific kind of coordination artifacts. In particular, the importance of
institutional roles as artifacts that assign conventional powers is investigated.
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1. Introduction
Institutions are usually conceived as normative sys-
tems that structure social interactions. It is especially in
the economic literature that institutions have been scien-
tifically approached by means of the game-theoretical
apparatus to provide models of how institutions can
evolve from the independent interactions of individual
agents. A general property of economic models is to
focus on institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ (North,
1990), the set of constraints that evolve (or are centrally
issued) to regulate agents’ interactions. Part of these
rules are in the interest of the individual agents them-
selves (as in the case of coordination games, Lewis,
1969) while others are needed to solve cooperation
dilemmas that, if left to individuals, would not be solved
(as in the prisoner dilemma or in mixed coordination
games).
While different ways of modeling the normative compo-
nent characterize different disciplines, its centrality in the
understanding what institutions are, is undisputed.
However it is part of a renewed interest in the founda-
tions of institutions in social philosophy to stress also their
intrinsic conceptual or constitutive nature (Searle, 1969,
1995; Tuomela, 2002). What is specific to institutions (as
opposed to mere regulating conventions) is that they are
also defined by constitutive rules (Rawls, 1955; Searle,
1969). These rules create a new level of activities by defin-
ing that ‘‘X counts as Y in context C’’ as in the case of ‘‘this
piece of paper counts as ‘money’ in Europe’’. By regulating
this new level, institutions constrain and influence the con-
crete practical actions of the agents.
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For example, many economic models have been pro-
posed to explain how the institution of money can evolve
(see Hodgson, 2002 for a review). However these models
assume that the agents are already acquainted with all
the practices that will be regulated by the evolved institu-
tions. In general, what is missing is that the most basic
function of considering something as money, is precisely
to enable the agents to do something new which is paying,
pricing, and saving and whatever we can do inside the insti-
tution of money. Moreover, it is a characteristic of these
institutional actions that have normative consequences,
viz. if I have paid for this commodity, I have the ‘‘right’’
to claim its use (Searle, 1969).
As it is generally acknowledged, an institution is a solu-
tion to coordination problems of a collective, but what
seems to be special in the case of institutions is that such
coordination is obtained thanks to the constitution of a
new level of actions that can be done. The coordination
is mainly achieved with the creation of deontic ‘enable-
ments and requirements’ that are the opportunities and
constraints that influence the agents’ interactions. In this
paper, we will try to disentangle the cognitive and behav-
ioral mediation of institutions. Institutions will be seen as
a specific kind of ‘coordination artifacts’ that is man made
products with the function of coordinating a collective of
agents. Their peculiarity being that they achieve this result
by means of deontic mediators that enable multi-agent
actions. While we acknowledge the fundamental role of
the deontic dimension, in this paper we are particularly
interested in the conceptual one (the mediating role of con-
ceptual schemas). Hence the institutionalization process
will be considered as a specific kind of conceptualization.
In agreement with Searle (1995), we will consider institu-
tional actions (i.e., the action of ‘paying’) as prior to the
institutional objects (i.e., ‘money’) and so we will provide
an account of how this kind of actions are constituted.
Our main thesis will be that institutional actions are always
multi-agent (or collective) actions. Finally, we will provide
an account of how an individual is empowered by the col-
lectivity in executing an action which is a collective action
(conventional power). Such empowerment, it will be argued,
is due to a form of unintentional collective permission.
2. The cognitive nature of constitutive rules
Much of the contemporary philosophical debate on the
nature of institutions has a declared ontological aim. It is
claimed that institutional facts like ‘being the president of
Italy’ or ‘being married to Mary’ exist in the world but
are different in their ontological status from brute facts like
‘being a mountain’ or ‘being a water molecule’ (Smith &
Searle, 2003).
Differently, our interest is not so much in the ontology
of social reality (how social and institutional facts exist)
but in modeling how institutions are constructed and
conduct their affairs through the minds and the actions
of the involved agents (how institutions work) (Conte &
Castelfranchi, 1995). The seminal work of John Searle is
somewhere in the middle and, as a matter of fact, it has
inspired authors across many disciplines. We agree with
Searle that there is a ‘primacy of the micro-level’ where
the individual agents constitute the institution by consider-
ing something as something else.
2.1. Constitutive rules as triadic relations
Rawls (1955) has been the first to introduce the distinc-
tion between two different conceptions of rules. The sum-
mative conception of rules refers to rules that emerge or
are issued in order to regulate already existing actions.
The practice conception, differently, relates to rules that
create the possibility for a new action by creating a new
description for the action. This second notion of rule has
been properly named by Searle constitutive (Searle, 1969).
From the perspective of a cognitive scientist, rules of the
kind ‘‘X counts as Y in C’’ seem to regulate a cognitive
activity, viz. the proper application of a concept. In other
words, a constitutive rule describes, albeit very abstractly,
a ‘recognition’ process. Because such rules are used to
describe the constitutive nature of institutions, the institu-
tionalization process turns out to be a specific case of con-
ceptualization of an entity in the world.
The application of a concept in fact can be represented
in form of a rule that associates a specific set of stimuli
(‘something such and such’) X with a linguistic label Y.
This model however is too simplistic also for an abstract
account because it does not properly identify the underly-
ing cognitive mediation. The Y term in the relation col-
lapses two different entities: the Cognitive Type1 (CT)
and its label. A more appropriate formula to express such
a relation is that ‘‘X, seen as a token of a CT, counts as Y,
in C’’ (see Fig. 1). Counts as relations are triadic relations
where the set of stimuli S are interpreted through a concep-
tual schema or cognitive type CT, and such a schema can
also be associated with a linguistic label.2 The relation
between the stimuli and the schema is a token-type relation.
2.2. ‘Institutionalization’ is also a kind of conceptualization
It is a possible mistake to treat counts as relations
between two terms as a signification process between two
1 We borrow from Eco (1997) the expression Cognitive Type to refer to
the set of representations that characterize a specific type. As emphasized
already by Johnson-Laird (1983) such representations can be of different
formats, from images, to propositions, to sensorimotor ones.
2 In our account, what really matters is not the label but the concept. It is
the concept that gives meaning to the stimuli and we react to this meaning.
One might claim that a label is necessary for building a concept. However
this is another issue. The label is also necessary for having the concept
more or less shared in a community and for the ‘negotiation’ process
about our coordinated cognition. For a computational model of the
reciprocal influence between conceptualization and labeling see Mirolli
and Parisi (2005) and for the sharing of categories by means of label use
and communication see Steels (2003).
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different entities, i.e. two distinct actions. Take this example
from Jones and Sergot (1996): in a department the signature
of the secretary (X term) counts as the signature of the boss
(Y term). While this a perfect possible case of institutional
action that should be appropriately modeled, it is quite dif-
ferent from the relation between the action of writing his
own name in certain conditions done by the boss that
counts as ‘signing’. When something stands for something
else, there are two distinct actions and one signifies the
other. It is often argued that the agents in the relation can
be the same. In such a case, one of the actions in the agent’s
repertoire signifies another and the two are distinct actions.
However there is a different form of signification such
as the one of typical of perception. Perception is always
a matter of inference. It is at least since the late forties
(Bruner & Goodman, 1947) that it is argued that percep-
tion is ‘‘necessarily the end product of a process of cat-
egorization [. . .] in which organisms move inferentially
from cues to category identity’’. Such a ‘perceptual semi-
osis’ is something different from the signification process
where something stands for something else. The ‘smoke’
stands for the ‘fire’ only after having been recog-
nized. Once a perceptual judgment is drawn, it can be
propositionally articulated so that also the presence of
‘fire’ is derived. The two judgments are always distinct
(see Fig. 2).
There is perceptual semiosis when a perceptual judg-
ment is inferentially drawn from something to the same
something, and not to something else (Eco, 1997). The rela-
tion between a token and a cognitive type, when some stim-
uli are interpreted through a pre-existing conceptual
schema, hence when they are recognized, is an inference.
A perceptual inference is the process of recognizing some-
thing as a token of a specific type. In this relation we say
that the token counts as the type.
In Section 3, we will propose our theory of action and
we will argue that an action is always a (supra-)action com-
posed of a vehicle action and an external delegated event.
The relation between the two is that the latter (the vehicle
action) is part of the former (the supra-action) and between
the two there is a cognitive mediation just as the one
sketched above.
An institutional action is recognized when an X is
considered as a token of the type Y, as when involved par-
ticipants see the action of writing one’s own name on a
paper as the institutional action of ‘signing’. The institu-
tionalization process establishes a code that specifies how
an action in certain context should be interpreted or, equiv-
alently, establishes the sufficient conditions for the applica-
tion of institutional concepts.
So far so good but to say that there is signification in the
process of institutionalization does not seem to be enough
for an adequate explanation. From our account it follows
that a similar code is established every time that a stimulus
is recognized.
To emphasize the peculiarity of institutional actions,
Searle argues that by defining that ‘‘objects that are
designed and used to be sat on by one person counts as
chairs’’ (Searle, 1995), we do not adopt a constitutive rule
because we are not ascribing the status to an object and,
with it, a function. The function of the chairs depends on
their physical features that are there independently of any
human agreement. However, at the same time, Searle
argues that functions are never intrinsic and always obser-
ver relative. In his theory, functions are always ascribed by
humans to the external material world.
In the remaining parts of this section we intend to pro-
vide an alternative account of the functions of artifacts in
order to stress more the similarity with institutions than
their differences. The reason why this is important for
our analysis will be clarified in Section 5.
2.3. The double empowerment of tools and artifacts
In Conte and Castelfranchi (1995, p. 125) a precise
notion of ‘function’ has been introduced. A function is
‘‘an external goal placed on a system that results in a trans-
formation of the structural properties of the system’’. The
external goal is usually internal to another goal-governed
agent, but what is specific relative to weaker notions like
‘use’ and ‘destination’ is that the physical characteristics
of the system are caused by the external goal.
Even having stated that the goals modify the shape of
the system, if we assume that external goals are always
internal to some other agents then our definition could be
considered quite similar to the one advanced by Searle.
However, we also claim that there exist external goals that
are not internal to any agent at all.Fig. 2. A simple model of perceptual semiosis and of signification.
Fig. 1. The triadic counts as relation as a simplified model of recognition.
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Examples of these stronger notions of external goals are
the biological and social finalities or functions (Castelfran-
chi, 2001; Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995). Finalities are
selecting effects that modify an organism’s characteristics
in a way that will render it more adaptive.
Let x be an entity instantiated in a sequence of distinct
repetitions (x1, . . .,xn). A sequence of repetitions is defined
as a set of occurrences of the same entity linked in such a
way that each is produced by the preceding, and produces
the following occurrences (if any) in the sequence, thanks
to whatever mechanism of reproduction. Let Bx be the
set of behaviors or characteristics of x, a finality or function
can be defined as follows:
(1) some items in Bx produces effects unintended by, and
unknown to, x;
(2) any item in x that produces the unintended effect is
functional, if that effect acts through a causal feedback
loop on the mechanism of reproduction, favoring x’s
reproduction, and as a consequence, that of the item
themselves.
Such an effect is no longer a simple one among the oth-
ers but is a finality of the behavior or characteristic in ques-
tion. It has selected and shaped that behavior or
morphology to be as it is. It needs a set of reproduction
mechanisms and a feedback mechanism to select some vari-
ations or to reinforce the corresponding behavior.
The set of reproduction mechanisms can be the most
various from the anticipatory mental representation of
a future effect of one’s own action, to reinforcement
learning mechanisms, to natural or artificial selection.
Our notion of function is intended to be general enough
to cover both functions that originate from intentional
behavior of agents like designers of artifacts (the external
goal on the artifact is internal to some agent) and the bio-
logical and social finalities (where the external goal is not
internal to any agent at all).3
Consequently, since our notion of function is relative to
a goal, we need also a more general notion of it beyond the
mental one. A goal can be defined as a sieve used to select
the (morphological or behavioral) properties of a system
such that at time t1 such properties are not the result of
chance, but of its preceding history (t0) that consists in
the rejections resulting from the sieve sifting the alterna-
tives of a given property.
Adopting this general definition, that covers both internal
and external goals, we argue that functions are not observer
relative at all.4 We claim that artifacts have ‘intrinsic’ func-
tions that have shaped their characteristics.5
However, if we focus only on artifacts that must be
employed by an agent to achieve their function (not auto-
matic or autonomous), a sort of dependence on the
involved agents is still there.
Something is usable as a chair even if it is not recognized
as a chair, however this possibility of being used as a chair
will never be actualized if somebody does not recognize it
as a chair. In this recognition process, the agent needs to
infer a possible use of the artifact. Notwithstanding its
intrinsic function, if the agent does not acknowledge its
use, the artifact seems to lack the status of being fully a
chair.
The ‘use’ of something is a weaker notion relative to the
notion of ‘function’. We consider the ‘use’ as the simplest
notion of external goal. Even if something does not have
a function, it can still have a use. When an agent has a goal
to achieve, and something ‘can’ give him the power of
achieving it because of its existing (morphological or
behavioral) properties, then it has a use (and that some-
thing becomes a tool).
Let BT be the set of behaviors or characteristics of T, T
has a use U if and only if there exists at least an agent x
with a goal G such that a non empty sub-set of BT is a suf-
ficient condition for x to achieve G.
We say that such a tool (and of course a proper artifact)
provides the agent with the physical power of achieving at
least one of his goals (for a recent analysis of power rela-
tions see Castelfranchi, 2003).
However, to effectively have the power of achieving
the goal, even an artifact with a function needs to be rec-
ognized as usable which means that the agent is able to
infer how the artifact is supposed to be used (rules of
use). In this sense, every artifact, to physically empower
3 According to Vermaas and Houkes (2003), this account could be
classified as a non-intentionalist reproduction etiological theory. Vermaas
and Houkes argue that, as far as the ascription of function to technical
artifacts is concerned, etiological theories fail in their account. While there
is no space to argue for the adequacy of our theory to their requirements,
we think that our account is tenable and left a precise defense for future
work. They also claim that reproduction theories must be intentionalist to
account for artifacts. However, if we consider institutions as artifacts it is
clear that, while they are man made ‘social objects’ they need not
necessarily be intentionally created.
4 With this definition of ‘goal’ as a ‘sieve’ we are able to cover also the
case in which a novel artifact is invented by a solitary designer (the fourth
desideratum in Vermaas & Houkes, 2003). In this case, the anticipatory
representation of its intended use is a sieve that selects the physical
characteristics (means-end reasoning) among a set of possible anticipated
alternatives. Then, once a model is chosen, the continual iteration of the
test between the intended structural characteristics and the actual ones
represents the ‘re-production mechanism’ by adapting the building
actions. Actually the artifact is first produced in the designer’s mind and
then re-produced in the physical reality.
5 For the aim of this paper the actual account of functions of artifacts is
enough. However it is of course a very strong simplification to state that
the function of an artifact is the goal of the designer had in building it, and
that only such goal has causally modified its morphology. The history of
technology is full of cases in which the function of an artifact has emerged
after cycles of trials and errors of social use (Basalla, 1988; Ziman, 2000).
A proper model needs to explain this mechanism in which the social
‘destination’ of an artifact to a recurrent use evolve in a new ‘function’.
For the technical notion of ‘destination’ in this framework see Conte and
Castelfranchi (1995).
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the agent, always depends on the agents that are evalu-
ating it.
How agents reason about the use of tools and arti-
facts, how they ascribe a use, is an important issue both
in cognitive science and cognitive neuro-science. An
important debate divides those giving a central role to
the perception of affordances, which actions are ‘affor-
ded’ by the object (Gibson, 1979), and those contending
the prominence of the ascription of the intention of the
object’s creator. For the aim of this paper it is not nec-
essary to propose a model for this kind of reasoning.6
What is relevant is that when something is considered
as a chair, this recognition activates appropriate learned
motor schemas. Chao and Martin (2000), for example,
show that tool recognition activates the left ventral pre-
motor cortex and that this is necessary for a proper cat-
egorization. The agents that recognize a tool or an
artifacts react having at least a disposition to adopt the
appropriate actions. Those motor schemas are part of
the cognitive type of such tools and artifacts (see Borghi,
2004 for a review).
From this perspective, to say that ‘‘objects that are
designed and used to be sat on by one person counts as
chairs’’ is something more that a simple description. A sort
of empowerment is present also when agents appropriately
recognize a tool or an artifact. Conceptualization of arti-
facts is a form of empowerment.
We can consider this process as a double empowerment.
By recognizing artifacts and tools as usable – somehow
acknowledging their ‘rules of use’ – (1) and by using them
(2) agents become able to produce new physical effects in
the world. Because the former kind of empowerment is
mediated by the agent itself we consider it a process of arti-
ficialization. Even if the process is individual, it is the agent
that produces it by means of his (individual) cognitive
mediation, and so in the end he acquires additional artifi-
cial powers.7
In this paper, the scope of constitutive rules will be
extended to the establishment of the sufficient conditions
for the applicability of concepts that somehow artificially
empower the agents.8 A more appropriate term for our
purposes would be considering as. When somebody consid-
ers a X as a Y, he sees and treat it as a Y. This double cog-
nitive and behavioral mediation is of fundamental
importance for our account.
This process is very similar to the Searlian idea that in
constitutive rules there need to be a function that is there
because a status has been recognized. Besides our account
of tools and artifacts is very close to the idea that there is a
primacy of actions over objects. The fact that ‘‘the object is
the continuous possibility of the activity’’ (Searle, 1995)
applies similarly well both to institutions and to tools
and artifacts more generally: the knife exist only relative
to the need of enabling ‘cutting’ actions, and such actions
exist only thanks to the artifacts.
To the eyes of the agents, the tie between the artifact and
the enabled actions is so strict the ordinary language allows
expressions such ‘the goal of the knife is to cut’. This com-
mon conception treats the action as intrinsic to the artifact.
‘Cutting’ is something that pertains to ‘knifes’ as if it were a
power of the artifact to cut and not of the agent using it. In
Section 5, we will argue that a similar mis-attribution is
present also in the recognition of actions done in institu-
tional roles.
However we agree with Searle that the basic mecha-
nism that is present in institutions is slightly different
from the one sketched above for usual tools and artifacts.
The power of achieving the function is not simply relative
to the physical features of the term X and the artificial
power added by recognition of a use by the agent. Some-
thing more is needed, a specific form of artificial power
(conventional power) must be provided to the agents that
act in the institution. In Section 4 we will advance a
model of this conventional power based on a form of col-
lective permission.
To conclude, our claim is that to institutionalize some-
thing is to assign a specific kind of artificial powers to it
by means of a conceptualization that can be expressed by
counts as formulas.
3. From physical to institutional actions
Even if we have claimed that we are not inspired by
an ontological aim, a sort of ontology is always implied
when advancing a conceptual analysis such ours. To
make it explicit, our ontological statement is that institu-
tional actions, like paying, marrying, promising, having
precedence and so on and so forth, are concrete physical
actions in the physical world. What is special is that (1)
they always are collective actions or multi-agent actions.
What makes them different from other collective actions
like moving a table, cooking or dancing together is (2) a
specific cognitive and behavioral mediation necessary for
their success. Moreover we will argue that (3) there is
also a specific coordination function which is absent in
collaborative activities oriented to the achievement of a
usual practical goal. In what follows we provide a model
of institutional actions. We will characterize different
actions from the most basic physical ones to the social,
communicative, and collective ones. In the end we will
6 For a model that integrates these approaches see Barsalou, Sloman,
and Chaigneau (2003).
7 The individualistic characterization of this process is not of course the
only possible. If we assume that an agent can try to understand what is the
intended use of an artifact (what the designer intended it for) this process
become a social empowerment. In fact there is a social dependence
between the designer and the user and the former one has sort of power
over the latter. By designing the artifact so that it is more easily usable the
former is ‘practically permitting’ to the latter the action. For the technical
notion of power over see Castelfranchi (1990, 2003).
8 That the counts as formulas express sufficient conditions for the
applicability of concepts is a statement that is common also in other
approaches (Jones & Sergot, 1996; Po¨rn, 1977). However these authors do
not share the artificial empowerment condition. As we will see in Section 3
this is not limited to the recognition of tools and artifact.
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argue that institutional actions are a specific case of col-
lective actions done by a group.
3.1. Physical actions
In our model an action A is composed of a vehicle
action a and of an external delegated event E on which
the agent relies to achieve its intended results. The action
A can be named supra-action to distinguish it clearly from
the vehicle one.9 However to avoid awkward technical
expressions in the rest of the paper we will refer to
supra-actions simply as actions with a uppercase literal
to identify them.
A classical example is that the agent intends to turn on
the light in the room. This action is done by doing the
vehicle action of flipping the switch. In our model the
agent relies also on some external events such as the fact
that the electric circuit once open will bring it about that
the light is on (see similarly also Po¨rn, 1977).
The vehicle action a is a sequence of bodily movements
done intentionally, in the example it is the sequence of
movements done by the agent to flip the switch. The result
r of these movements brings it about a specific external
event (the circuit is open). Such an event is a causal com-
plex that contributes to the achievement of the result R
of the action A (the light is on). We say that such an event
is delegated because the agent is relying on the event in
order to achieve the intended result R (Castelfranchi,
1998). The agent intends to do A, by intending to do a
and intending that10 such event E obtains, in order that R
is achieved (see Fig. 3).
The example of turning on the light can be misleading
because it seems to be a complex case relative to more
basic actions. However our claim is that for every action
done in a context the agent always relies on the external
world. The example is simply used to offer a clear case
where the relation between the vehicle action and other
events is evident.
A minimal model of action implies that the agent
believes that his action A is necessary and sufficient to
achieve R (while the vehicle action is only necessary) and
that he can obtain R by doing A.11
This second belief can be named Power of belief. To do
A the agent needs to believe he has the power of achieving
his goal R by doing his action A. Having such physical
power means that the agent is able and in condition to
achieve R by doing A. The theory of power is complex
and very articulated. In Castelfranchi (2003) such a theory
has been proposed. For the aims of this paper it is sufficient
to recall that the subjective power (believing to have a
power) is, for cognitive agents, a necessary condition for
the objective one. An agent has an objective power when,
given his goals, he has the internal (skills, motivation,
etc.), and external resources (tools and artifacts or what-
ever) and the conditions for action are such that if he acts,
he achieves those goals.
However, if he, for any reason, wrongly believes that he
lacks the power of A, then he will not be able to intend to
do A. Consequently, also his objective power somehow
disappears.12
3.2. Simple social actions
The simplest notion of socially mediated action is when
what is needed for the action A to achieve its intended
result R is simply an internal reaction (i.e. a feeling) of
another agent (see Fig. 4).
An example of this kind of social action is ‘to scandalize
somebody’. To scandalize an agent has to bring it about a
feeling of scandal in somebody else, viz. a feeling of being
Fig. 3. A model of physical/practical action. Fig. 4. A model of ‘scandalizing’.
9 Another possible term could be macro-action but this term is used to
refer to pattern of actions that are developed out of more micro-patterns,
for example routinized procedure can be executed without planning of
more basic or primitive actions (McGovern & Sutton, 1998). The macro-
action is intended as a single action but is composed of more elementary
building blocks not intentionally executed. In this sense every macro-
action can be a vehicle action.
10 Several authors (Sellars, 1967; Vermazen, 1993; Grosz & Kraus, 1996)
have proposed that we should distinguish between at least two kinds of
intentions: intention to do something and intention that something be the
case. While it is common to say the one intends to go to the movie tonight,
it is also possible to formulate the intention that you come with me. The
real meaning of having an intention that something is the case is precisely
that the agent believes that he has to do and can do something and that
intends to do whatever it is necessary to make it the case that p. We extend
this notion so that not only other agents but also events and artifacts can
be objects of intention that.
11 The same action can be the vehicle of different supra-actions (for
example flipping the switch can be ‘firing the bomb’), and the same action
can be supported by different vehicle actions (for example I can turn the
light on simply by snapping).
12 For a initial formal model of this theory of power using an algebraic
approach see Boella, Sauro, and van der Torre (2004).
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provoked and offended by something which is against the
accepted morality. An agent can scandalize without intend-
ing it and in this case this is not an ‘action’ done by the
agent. However he can decide to intentionally scandalize
an observer. If a nice girl Mary intentionally walks naked
in her house knowing that an old nosy lady is looking at
her, she intends to scandalize somebody. This means that
she intends to do a vehicle action a (walking naked) to
do an action A (scandalize the old lady). In this case, to
achieve her intended result, the lady should recognize her
action a and react internally to it (feeling the scandal).
Notice that to achieve this result it is not necessary that
the observer recognizes the action A that she is uninten-
tionally contributing in bringing it about. The minimal
contribution that the other agent has to do is to react to
the understood vehicle action. If this recognition fails, the
action of ‘scandalizing’ does not obtain. A similar action
is also to caress somebody. It is possible in fact to caress
somebody only if he can feel some sensations as a conse-
quence of a gentle movement of an hand. It is part of the
action of caressing that the other agent feels such
sensations.
A slightly different case is that of ‘handing something to
somebody’. John handing a flower to Mary is not simply
John bringing it about that Mary is close to a flower. If
John with a movement of the arm brings the flower close
to Mary, he has not handed the flower to Mary. To really
‘hand’ it to Mary, the vehicle action must be recognized by
Mary has a token of the action concept ‘handing’, which
means that Mary should acknowledge the intention of
bringing it about that she has the flower by means of his
movements. By understanding that it is John’s intention
that Mary is close to the flower, Mary is contributing to
the accomplishment of action A (see Fig. 5).
Actions like handing necessarily rely on communication.
There is a message in the practical action of bring it about
the case that somebody is close to something when it is a
case of ‘handing’. By doing the practical action of making
Mary close to the flower, John is also emitting a message
without employing any conventional code.13
In this case, to bringing it about that R, it is a necessary
condition that the involved agent recognizes in the vehicle
action a the supra-action. A is artificially created also with
her contribution. It is important to notice that the involved
agent also believes that the other has the power of execut-
ing the action A.
3.3. Intermezzo: the co-power of agents
In more complex forms of socially mediated actions
the recognition of the supra-action A (cognitive media-
tion) is necessary but not sufficient to bringing it about
that R is the case. There needs to be also a behavioral
mediation. In order that R might be realized (and so A
might be executed), the involved agents should act. A
typical case for this kind of actions is when agents act
together. Consider the case of the supra-action A ‘assem-
bling a car together’. It does not make any sense of
course to say that an individual agent is ‘assembling
the car together’ alone. Acting together is an action done
by a collective which means that each involved agent
should do his share in A with appropriate attitudes so
that A is done14.
It is not necessary for this paper to provide a complete
model of such actions15 and arguing for or against a spe-
cific account of the required attitudes being them collective
intentions (Searle, 1995), we-intentions (Tuomela, 1995) or
shared intentions (Bratman, 1992). Whatever the most ten-
able account turns out to be, an intentional collaborative
activity is by definition caused by the specific intentional
attitudes of the participants towards the collective action
A. In fact, the action of assembling the car together cannot
be done by a single agent but it is done by the collectivity in
question. None of the single agents has the power of doing
the ‘assembling the car together’ alone, but the collectivity
has it.
To define power ofA in such a situation we need to intro-
duce the notion of co-power (Castelfranchi, 2003). An agent
can individually lack the power of assembling the car. But
he can assemble it together with other agents. There is a
co-power of assembling the car by means of the individual
powers of doing one’s own share. In this case, only cooper-
ation (agents sharing the same end), or, more generally, the
Fig. 5. A model of ‘handing’.
13 We name this kind of tacit and unconventional communication
processes behavioral implicit communication. There is this form of
communication whenever usual practical actions (like eating, walking,
sitting etc.) or their traces (footprints) are intentionally done also for
communicating something (making somebody else believe something)
without employing any special codified mark. Think of the case of a scout
leaving his safe footprints in a mined field for his fellows. For the general
theory of behavioral implicit communication see Castelfranchi (2005) and
for an initial formal model see Omicini, Ricci, Viroli, Castelfranchi, and
Tummolini (2004).
14 In the analysis of the concept of acting together it is usually avoided to
consider joint-action concepts like kissing or quarreling where it is part of
the concept that the action is done together (see for example Bratman,
1992). However it is important to notice that agents have developed action
concepts that transcend their individual boundary of action and that
directly refer to a collective. In particular, it will be argued that
institutional action-concepts are solutions to coordination problems that
embody multi-agent actions in single-agent action concepts.
15 See Grosz and Kraus (1996) and Tuomela (1995) for two alternative
detailed models.
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combination of the individual powers in the same plan for
the same end, allows the fulfillment of this end. This power
is the power of the Collective. The collective can even have
more power than the trivial sum of the powers of its mem-
bers in the sense that the set of goals that the agents are able
to achieve if they act together could be larger.
3.4. Complex social actions (intentional collaborative
activity)
In collaborative activities, there is more than one agent
executing the necessary vehicle actions {a,b, . . . ,n} and
each of these vehicles are part of the collective action A.
However for each agent the actions of the others are part
of the external delegated event on which each of them
relies. Take the case of assembling the car together. The
external delegated event here is both the assembly line that
clearly has a role in the activity (i.e., to pass the semi-fin-
ished product to the next worker) and, each agent’s share
in the activity seen as a contribution to the accomplishment
of A. The real vehicle actions when a set of agents is acting
together are their shares in the supra-action.
In fact, a simple practical reasoning schema (I) for a
cooperative collective action is:
(1) Ag1 intends that R.
(2) Ag1 believes that unless A is done, R will not be
achieved.
(3) Ag1 believes that unless everybody does his share of
A, R will not be achieved (co-power belief).
(4) Ag1 intends that everybody does his shares of A.
Is the fact that everybody does his own share equal to
doing the actions {a,b, . . .,n}? For us this is not sufficient.
In fact each agent should do the necessary vehicle actions
{a,b, . . .,n} as his share in A. To do a (painting the body
of the car) as one’s own share in A (assembling the car
together) is to do a for a specific reason, that is because
it is necessary for A.16 But this is not enough. It is also nec-
essary that the other involved agents recognize or see such
action a as your share in A. To do one’s own share is similar
to the simple social action of handing in the previous exam-
ple. It is a supra-action with identical structure. It is in fact
a communicative action, when one is doing his share in a
group activity is also emitting a message. If vehicle action
b is ‘painting the body of the car’ and supra-action B is
‘painting the body of the car as a share in assembling the
car together’, the agent can do B only if the others recog-
nize B in b. We argue that the identification of this kind
of supra-action is important for two distinct reasons.
The first is that while acting together, each agent dele-
gates to the others their shares of the Multi-Agent plan,
each relies on her fellow. As we have seen in schema (I)
each agent intends that the others do their part in the plan,
both in the sense that he can decide to help them if they are
having troubles (Grosz & Kraus, 1996) and in the sense
that he can reproach them if they disconfirm his
expectation.
As in the case of the supra-action ‘handing’, each agent
believes that the other agents have the power of doing the
supra-action, viz. doing their shares.
However in our example of ‘assembling the car
together’, each individual agent has the power of the vehi-
cles {a,b, . . .,n} as shares but the power of A is a co-power
of the collectivity and they are aware of it.
When acting together, each agent to do his share must
recognize in the vehicle actions of the others that they are
doing their share of A, viz., that they are acting together.17
In fact also the following schema (II) seems appropriate:
(1) Ag1 intends that R.
(2) Ag1 believes that everybody is doing {a,b, . . . ,n} as
their shares.
(3) Ag1 believes that unless everybody does his share of
A, R will not be achieved (co-power belief).
(4) Ag1 intends to do his share a as a vehicle of A.
Assuming that each agent has the goal R, his belief that
other are doing their shares is a reason to do his own. Each
of them is aware that A is a multi-agent action, and that
their own shares are necessary for the achievement of R.
R is the artificial effect of the collective action of all the
involved agents. The complexity of acting together lies in
this complex cognitive and behavioral mediation that can
be summarized in (see Fig. 6):
(1) the real vehicle actions {a ,b, . . .,n} are the actions
necessary to the achievement of A done as shares in
A;
(2) hence such actions are supra-actions that need to be
recognized to be realized;
(3) given the fact that the agents recognize the shares
they have reasons to do their own shares in A;
(4) their acting accordingly to this recognition bring it
about that R and consequently also A is
accomplished.
Seeing the doing of one’s own share as a cognitively
mediated action is important also for a second reason. It
allows in fact the minimal definition of what a group is
for the aims of this paper.
16 This instrumental characterization of the process is enough for
describing a minimal case of ‘acting together’ without group identification
or for groupness (Tuomela, 1995). This minimal case should correspond to
the acting together in the I-Mode in Tuomela’s taxonomy.
17 The communicative function of the vehicle actions ‘doing one’s own
share’ is precisely to let all the agents know that they are acting together.
The common knowledge that they are acting together is one of the reason
to keep acting together until R is achieved. There is a communicative
function and not a communicative intention because the agent does not
necessarily realize that they are also communicating. But because they do
so, they keep on acting and reproducing the mechanism.
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Given an agent Ag that is executing an action a, we
define a Group at time t as the non empty set of all the
agents G whose recognition of a at t and the action a(q)
at t + 1 bring it about the case that the result R of the col-
lective action obtains. We write a(q) to stress the fact that
the action is a function of the output of the recognition
process, that is the action a associated to q. Each time an
agent has the goal R and recognizes in the action of
another one a doing of one’s own share in the accomplish-
ment of a supra-action A such that R is achieved, the two
forms a minimal group.
This notion of group is however more general because it
intends to cover also the kind of collective action typical of
institutional actions which is different from the ‘acting
together’ type.
The next paragraph is precisely devoted to outline a
model of institutional actions.
3.5. Institutional actions as an unintentional collaborative
activity
In the preceding sections we have shown that for some
socially mediated actions, it is a necessary condition that
the involved agents recognize in the vehicle action a the
supra-action A. This is necessary for example ‘to hand
something to somebody else’ or to ‘assembly a line
together’. Alternatively such a process of recognition could
be described as the fact that ‘a counts as A in C’. In our
opinion, the description with the constitutive rule in such
cases is particularly appropriate also against Searle’s
requirements. In fact it is only thanks to this cognitive
mediation that the supra-action of ‘handing something’ is
realized and achieve its intended results which also include
appropriate beliefs in the participants’ mind.
The case of ‘assembling the car together’ is more com-
plex because it involves also a behavioral mediation.
Agents should overtly act accordingly to the recognition
of A in order to realize the effect that is necessary to iden-
tify the action A. What is special when agents act together
is that they recognize their Aing during the execution.
Another difference between the simple and the complex
case is that when somebody is recognizing a ‘handing’, he
believes that the agent has the power of the supra-action.
While in the case of ‘assembling the car together’ the agents
only believe that each of them has the power of doing their
own shares. As we have seen, they believe that A is a co-
power of the group.
What is the peculiar mechanism of institutional actions
instead?
Take the institutional action of ‘marrying’. If Paul, the
priest, is marrying John and Mary such action can be exe-
cuted only if there is a set of agents recognizing it. The
involved agents see the vehicle actions of the priest as a
token of the Cognitive Type ‘to marry’ (cognitive media-
tion). While necessary, this condition however is not
sufficient.
As in the case of ‘acting together’ for such an action to
have physical effects in the world (and so to exist), it is also
necessary that the set of involved actors act accordingly to
this interpretation (treat as). Because they have recognized
that the institutional action A has already occurred, they
consequently believe the R obtains, viz. that John and
Mary are married (mutual belief that R is true).
Either the belief that the supra-action has been accom-
plished or simply its reactive interpretation (disposition
to behave), trigger the agent to treat the vehicle action a
as A and so act on this basis (behavioral mediation).
All the involved agents (both the priest and the partici-
pants) have an expectation on the success of A (achieve-
ment of R), on their mutual recognition of A and on the
consequent reactions of all the others. Moreover each of
them also feels the expectations of the others on his own
behavior, and all these expectations are reasons for the
agents to behave as expected (Sugden, 1998; Castelfranchi,
Giardini, Lorini, & Tummolini, 2003). By acting on the
basis of their mutual expectations that R is true, they phys-
ically behave in the way that makes R true.
This acting accordingly is coordinated and produces the
effects of action A. In the end the belief that the agent Ag1
has the power of A is true and the expectations on the
result and on the others are validated. This is the mecha-
nism of self-fulfilling prophecies (see Fig. 7). As in the case
of ‘acting together’ the supra-action is a multi-agent action
that is done by the collective. Differently, all the involved
agents believe that the agent that is executing the vehicle
action has also the power of executing the supra-action.
There is a trivial interpretation for the claim that every
institutional action is a multi-agent action. An opponent
could easily argue that it is obvious that a wedding is a
multi-agent collaborative activity. Many agents are cover-
ing many institutional roles (a priest, a husband, a wife,
two best men, etc.), and all of them are necessary to achieve
the intended results that agents John and Mary are
Fig. 6. A model of doing the action A together by doing a and b.
Fig. 7. A model of doing the institutional action of ‘marrying’.
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married. However this is only what the agents in the group
believe that they are doing, it is their subjective interpreta-
tion of the event.
Our claim is that every individual action in the institu-
tion is actually a multiagent action where the collectivity
unintentionally collaborate so that the individual agent
achieves his intended results. Differently from the previous
case, this collaborative action is not intentional. While dur-
ing the ceremony each agent acting in the institutional role
cooperates intentionally with the other, they are also unin-
tentionally cooperating in a very different way.
No single agent in the collective has the power of exe-
cuting the institutional action by himself. In a sense that
will be clarified later, this power is given by all the others.
Even without any acknowledgment of this process, the
whole group is helping the agent in doing the action by
doing the necessary actions that achieve the intended
result.
In our account, the supra-action of marrying Mary and
John is done by the whole group G of involved agents. So
given an agent Ag that is executing a vehicle action a, we
have defined a Group at time t as the non empty set of all
the agents G whose recognition of a at t and the action
a(q) at t + 1 bring it about the case that the result R of
the collective action obtains. It is this group that is doing
the institutional action, not only the agent Ag1.
As it is clear the notion of ‘group’ in institutional actions
is local, context dependent and dynamic. If an agent pays a
sum to another in a desert the group is the collection of the
two. If it does so in a shop all the involved participants that
react in some way to this actions are part of the group. It is
of course part of the group the agent himself that is execut-
ing the institutional actions.
Differently we can also define the Community C of
agents as the non empty set of all the agents that can rec-
ognize that institutional action. Such a concept of commu-
nity identifies all the agents that potentially can recognize
the institutional action and that potentially can act accord-
ingly. This means that a community is formed by all the
agents sharing certain Cognitive Types of institutional
actions.
From this, it follows plainly that a Group is a subset of
the Community sharing that institutional Cognitive Type.
The concept of Community, with its potential involvement
in the institutional action, is crucial to understand how an
institutional action can last much more than the simple
time of its execution.
There are cases of institutional actions whose duration is
very short. If, approaching a roundabout, I take the ‘prece-
dence’ and you acknowledge this, I pass and from there on
the action is completed. Differently, take the case of the
priest that is marrying Mary and John. Being married is
supposed to last forever. From our account it follows that
such an action is done by the all the Group of the involved
agents. In fact, if moving out of the church nobody
acknowledges their roles, the marrying action has never
occurred. The fact that a Community exists, viz. that any
potential new bystander is able to recognize their being
married and to react appropriately, is in fact a way of mar-
rying them again and again.
4. Institutionalization is artificial empowerment by
permitting
We have claimed that doing an institutional action A is a
co-power of the group G. However the involved agents in G
believe that Ag1 has the power of A and for this reason,
assume that A has been executed. From the subjective
point of view, agents believe that one of them has such a
power.
The cognitive and behavioral mediation of institutional
actions is necessary to achieve the result R of an institu-
tional action A. But because in the end the result intended
by the single agent is true, a single agent has in fact the
power of doing an action which is a multi-agent action.
How this is possible?
4.1. The co-power of preventing an institutional action
To disentangle this problem we need, first of all, a min-
imal account of what a practical permission is. Face-to-face
permission is a social relation between at least two agents x
and y relative to a possible intentional action A of y. It
implies:
(1) that y depends on x as for A (and x having power
over y as for A);
(2) that x adopts y’s goal (at least in a passive form: not
preventing it);
(3) that there is a social commitment of x to y not to con-
trast y.
It creates ‘rights’ for y and correspondent ‘obligations’
for x. It empowers y enabling an action that was where
impossible before. It requires also some either explicit or
implicit communication (to ask for/to give) since it is based
on mutual beliefs between x and y about the previous
conditions.
It is crucial to notice that when x permits an action to y,
x has a power of preventing y from doing A.
There are two clear distinct kinds of permissions that
have been noticed in the literature18 (Alchourron & Buly-
gin, 1981; Makinson & van der Torre, 2003) that in our
terms can be stated as:
(1) Permitting by abstaining from preventing (passive
permission or let).
18 There is also a third kind which is permitting by actively impeding that
an agent z negatively interferes with agent y. This example is a sub-case of
consenting where the impediment is not already established but could be.
This three party relation highlights the hierarchical structure between the
agents (Bulygin, 1986).
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(2) Permitting by removing an impediment (active per-
mission or consent). Agent y is impeded or prevented
from doing the action and agent x actively remove
the impediment.
We have seen that relative to the institutional action A,
it is the group of the involved agents that has the objective
co-power of doing it. But because the action is intended by
the single agent Ag1 when they behaviorally mediate its
vehicle action (acting accordingly to the recognition of A)
they are giving him also the power of doing it. Since it is
the group that can do the action, it is the group that has
the co-power of preventing the single agent Ag1.
The conventional/institutional empowerment is obtained
thanks to a functional permission of the kind consent. The
functional effect of the acting accordingly is that they pos-
itively interfere with Ag1 reinforcing his belief of having the
power of doing the action (Ag1 believes that he can do A, he
has the power of A). It is not simply the belief that he has
the power of doing A that empowers the agent but also the
fact that they act on this basis. This, together with the fact
that the expected result is produced, is evidence for the
agent that he has the power and so it provides additional
strength to this belief. Moreover because everybody acts
on the basis of their mutual belief that a single agent has
the power of doing A is reinforced (see Fig. 8). In this
model Ag1 is the priest and Ag2, Ag3, Ag4 are the involved
participants. Before and beyond an institutional normative
system, it is the participants that empowers the Priest in
doing the action. If the participant Ag4 does not act appro-
priately on the basis of the belief that the priest can marry
Ag2 and Ag3 and that they are married as a result of Ag1’s
action they in fact are not married because the priest
actually lacks the power of marrying them. The most basic
functional effect is precisely related to this propositional
content ‘‘The priest is empowered to marry’’. All the partic-
ipants believe and assume that he has such power but
are unaware of the fact that they (as a group and a commu-
nity) are empowering him by consenting him doing the
action, by actively conforming to his expectations and so
contributing to the achievement of the intended result.
To say that the conventional empowerment is the result
of act of permitting done by all the participants seems
strange because the involved agents are unaware of doing
this action, of giving this power. However this basic mech-
anism is always present even in cases when the power is
assigned by the normative system itself.
Makinson (1986) has argued that ‘having the power is
not the same as being permitted to use it’. The case it the
one of a priest that while having the power to marry two
people is not permitted to do it when they are of different
religions and one of the two is not converted to the rele-
vant one. If the priest marries them, they are married even
if he was not permitted to do it. Actually, for us, this
example shows that there should be a conflict in the
acknowledgment of the power of doing an action. It is
not the place here to argue for an adequate account of
this situation. It is sufficient to say that the most basic
and fundamental empowerment is the one given by the
involved actors. There is a complex hierarchy of levels
which involve both formal and informal authorities. The
formal authority has the conventional power of assigning
conventional powers (the lawmaker). The informal one
assigns these powers simply by their behavioral media-
tion, by acting accordingly to a given recognition (the
involved participants).
The latter is actually more fundamental because it is the
real support also for the first one. But due to the fact that
usually the informal authority does not know of having
such an objective power, it is not able to influence the for-
mal one.
The mechanism is stable also because, as we have seen, it
is a co-power of the involved participants not a single
power of any of them. None of them individually by decid-
ing not to accept the power of the priest is able to prevent
all the other from empowering him.
4.2. The puzzle of unintentional institutional actions
A problem with our model could arise from the fact that
we have only considered cases of intentional institutional
action. We have tried to disentangle the complex collective
activity that underlies a single institutional action. We have
argued that the belief on the conventional power is essen-
tial for the agent to execute the institutional action. How-
ever, this model seems to apply to the case of intentional
institutional actions only.
Differently, it is evident that there are a number of insti-
tutional actions that we perform that are non-intentional.
Think of the case of murdering. Killing a man and murder-
ing can be two very distinct kind of actions. Some instances
of the first, in certain conditions, are cases of the second.
Others are not, a soldier in battle is not murdering even
if he is killing thousands of men. There are very different
collective behaviors when we know that a specific soldier
has killed an enemy (or even an innocent civilian) with
the respect to the case that a killer has been discovered in
our block.
However it is very common that in both cases the
agents while intending to kill somebody do not intend to
perform an institutional action that is nevertheless
performed.Fig. 8. A model of conventional empowerment.
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Since in our model for an action to exist a movement of
the body must be intentionally performed, how is it possi-
ble that an unintentional institutional action does exist in
the very first place? Moreover since an agent to perform
an action needs the power to do it, how can such power
be acquired if the agent does not intend to perform the
institutional action at all?
The problem is even more deep if we assume that even
the vehicle action can be done unintentionally. If I acciden-
tally cause the death of somebody else, I am committing a
specific kind of homicide. In this case the vehicle is not even
an action of mine but, we would say, simply an event the I
have caused. Nevertheless, a real institutional action has
been performed.
Moreover, as we have seen an agent can acquire a con-
ventional power of doing an institutional action A through
a sort of collective permission of the kind consent. Partici-
pants do not give a permission but simply permit the action
by their acting accordingly. However the most basic issue
that still needs to be tackled is how, in fact, the involved
agents come to believe that he already has such power in
the first place. This belief is in fact necessary to activate
the self-reinforcing mechanism. Solving this issue will be
necessary also to address the previous problematic ques-
tions. To address these problems, an understanding of
the artifactual nature of institutions is necessary. To this
task is devoted the last section.
5. Why marriage is more similar to a table than a chair:
institutions as coordination artifacts
It is a platitude to argue that institutions seem to be
something external to the agents that enact them while
actually they are man made products evolved or designed
to coordinate agents’ activities. In this last section, we will
argue that institutions are artifacts of a specific kind, coor-
dination artifacts, that exist and are maintained by the col-
laborative (almost always unintentional) activity of the
collective.
Relative to other coordination artifacts institutions can
be distinguished for a specific way in which they achieve
this coordinating result.
5.1. Coordination in interference situations
Agents that live in a common world are agents whose
actions can interfere one with the other. Interference is
the most basic social notion in which the goals that an
agent is willing to achieve are favored (positive interfer-
ence) or hampered (negative interference) by the actions
of other agents (Castelfranchi, 1998).
For the aims of this paper, coordination between the
agents in interference situations is the combination of their
actions so that a non-empty set of Goals is achieved. Coor-
dination is not every arrangement of actions but the set of
the ‘good’ ones. There is a value implicit in coordination
that highlights that coordination is always evaluated
against a set of goals.19 Hence coordination in social inter-
action can be represented as the execution of a specific mul-
tiagent plan that solves an interference problem.
5.2. A definition of artifacts
As we have argued in Section 2, we claim that, given a
population P of agents, A is an artifact if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) there exists at least one agent x in P such that x
brings it about that A;
(2) there exists at least one agent y in P such that A has a
use U for y;
(3) U is one of the motivating results for x to bring it
about that A or y using A at t bring it about that x
bring it about that A again at some point in the future.
In other words, we identify an artifact as a kind of result
of an action, as something which is done (is brought about)
by an agent x in order to (intentionally or functionally) be
used by another agent y.20 It is too general to identify as an
artifact anything that is a man made product, a child is a
consequence of the actions of her parents but she is not
an artifact. It must be done for a use, so that if is done
to be sold to some other people it acquires an artifactual
nature.
This notion is also intended to be general enough to
cover cases that often are not accounted for. In fact also
traces of actions can be artifacts if they are done to be used
by others, so that footprints left on a mined field for the
followers are artifacts.
In the next paragraphs we intend to provide a first anal-
ysis of the use of artifacts for coordination purposes.
5.3. Tools and artifacts for coordination
Traces of actions can be the most basic kind of coordi-
nation artifacts. Consider the case of some people walking
in a park. The unintended effect of their walking is to mod-
ify the shape of the grass in a way that is visible to others.
Assuming that they prefer a beautiful meadow to one that
is completely trampled, they begin following the traces of
the others. After some time this self-reinforcing effect create
a real ‘path’ which is obviously an artifact. Even if it is not
designed explicitly by anyone, the function of this path is
also to coordinate the agents.
If an artifact, given its physical properties, is used for
coordination purposes but was not done for it, it simply
19 The goals to be satisfied can be also the one of an external agent that
designs the activity of others so that his goal is achieved. If the goals are
those of the involved agents, such goals can be parallel and complemen-
tary (coordination in collaboration), opposite (coordination in conflict) or
shared (coordination in cooperation). For a notion of parallel goals see
Sellars (1967) and Conte, Miceli, and Castelfranchi (1991).
20 Agents x and y can be the same agent.
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has a coordination use.Relative to this use, it is a tool andnot
an artifact. It is very common that agents exploit the physical
properties of artifacts to ease their coordination. Think of
the case ofMary thatwants to pour somewine to John.Mary
is carrying the bottle whose function is to preserve the wine
and to pour it. John has a glass whose function is to keep
the wine to drink it. During the process of pouring the wine,
Mary exploits some of the physical features of the bottle for
coordination. The observable inclination of the bottle and its
direction are used to communicate to John where to put the
glass.21 The function of the bottle is still to pour the preserved
liquid but its physical shape is exploited for coordination. It
is simply a use for coordination.
To really be a coordination artifact, it needs to have the
function of (shaped for) coordinating the agents’ actions.
In the case discussed above, if the design of the bottle
has been influenced by this possible use then it is a real
function.22 A table is in fact also a coordination artifact.
Its physical shape has been designed to support things that
are laid on it. This is the main practical use the table is
made for (practical function). However, because more than
one agent can eat at the same table, it must also be made
for avoiding interference problems so that agents can sit
at appropriate distances. Moreover this is evident also by
the fact that tables are designed with many shapes. Rectan-
gular tables convey a sort of hierarchy. The agents that sit
at the heads of it are more visible by all the others and con-
ventions can evolve such that in a family the head of the
table is assigned to the head of the family. Differently, a cir-
cular table is considered more egalitarian in its disposition.
The coordination function that some artifacts can have
is a specific kind of social function (Castelfranchi, 2001).
Following the definition provided in Section 2, a social
function is the set of effects of an action (intentional or
not) that favors or hampers the goals of other agents
and, because of this interference, somehow reinforces the
mechanism that have produced those effects. It is a coordi-
nation function when the achievement of the coordination
reinforces the actions that have solved the interference
problem.23
5.4. Physical and deontic ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’
As we have seen practical and coordination uses and
functions very often coexist. Even if we have distinguished
artifacts that have practical functions but only coordina-
tion uses (i.e. the bottle and glass) from artifacts that have
both practical and coordination functions (i.e. the emerged
path and the table), it is out of the scope of this paper to
offer an exhaustive typology of coordination artifacts.
For our argument however it is useful to identify differ-
ent ways in which such artifacts support the agents in
achieving coordination.
Proposition 1. There exist some artifacts such that their
physical opportunities and constraints and the recognition of
their use by an agent are necessary and sufficient conditions
to enable a single-agent action.
The use of every artifact is always related to ‘opportuni-
ties’ and ‘constraints’ that create sufficient conditions for
action execution. As we have seen, in some cases artifacts
also create necessary conditions to execute an action, such
as the ‘cutting’ that is possible if and only if the agent uses a
sort of knife. It is not only the fact that we have developed
an action concept for an agent using a knife. What is rele-
vant is that those specific physical effects, such as having
slices of meat, are not possible without the artifact. Nean-
derthals could only tear the meat to pieces while Homo
habilis acquired the power of cutting. Their actions reper-
toires were different. It is the case also of the chair that,
once its use is inferred, provides the agent with the physical
and the artificial power of ‘sitting’.24
In any case when a tool or an artifact is used for coor-
dination, the set of its physical characteristics is such that
some of them are affordances (or opportunities, in the sense
that they enable or facilitate the execution of some action)
while others are constraints (they create obstacles or
impediments to the execution of some action).
Proposition 2. There exist some artifacts such that their
physical opportunities and constraints are sufficient condi-
tions to enable a single-agent coordinated action.
The most basic mechanism by which an artifact can
coordinate several agents is, in fact, by imposing physical
enablements and constraints that define the sufficient con-
ditions for action. Only a sub-set of actions is possible
and by executing it the agent is coordinated with the oth-
ers. As an example take the corridor of a corral. Once
open, the animals flow coordinated out of it. The wall of
a house keeps separated people in the house from people
outside it because of its physical properties. These basic
21 Communication through artifacts, like in the example, is a case of
stigmergic communication. See note 13 for the notion of behavioral
implicit communication.
22 It is very difficult to discern mere ‘uses’ from ‘functions’ in concrete
cases because one should be able to identify the precise design and use
history of the artifact. However from a conceptual point of view the
distinction is sharp.
23 Our notion of coordination artifact is quite different from the notion of
coordination mechanism advanced by Schmidt and Simone (1996). The
interest in the use of artifacts for coordination purposes arose mainly in
literature on Computer Supported Collaborative Work. However in these
contexts, the artifact is mainly considered as a ‘‘permanent symbolic
construct’’ that objectifies a pre-designed protocol of actions (p. 165).
Examples of this kind of artifact are checklists and printed procedures.
The role of artifacts that are not symbolic such as a table or a rotunda is
completely underestimated. It is not the symbolic representation of a
protocol that concerns us, but its materialization in the physical
affordances (opportunities) and constraints.
24 This enabling feature of tools and artifacts is often considered as a
defining one. Tools and artifacts are means by which humans have
expanded their influencing sphere. They not only help humans in doing
better what they can do otherwise, but also empower them in doing what
was not possible before.
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mechanisms do not even need to be recognized to be ‘used’.
Actually agents do not realize of using something, they just
adaptively react to external circumstances.
Proposition 3. There exist some artifacts such that their
physical opportunities and constraints and the recognition of
their use by an agent are necessary and sufficient conditions
to enable a single-agent coordinated action.
In the case of the table whose set of physical opportuni-
ties and constraints and the recognition of the possible use
the table is needed to coordinate the agents. Agents need to
know how to use the table to actually achieve the coordina-
tion (viz. they should not try to sit at the same place). The
recognition of the coordination use can be expressed in
form of the technical norms that the agents endorse if they
want to reach their goals.
Proposition 4. There exist some artifacts such that their
physical opportunities and constraints and the recognition of
their use by an agent and the set of ‘cognitive opportunities
and constraints’ (deontic mediatiors) are necessary and
sufficient conditions to enable a single-agent coordinated
action.
There exist also artifacts that are the combination of dif-
ferent kinds of opportunities and constraints to achieve
coordination. Consider the case of a roundabout as a pro-
totypical one. Its physical properties are such that drivers
must necessarily slow down when approaching it and can
only go left or right. This is of course one of the main
intended functions of roundabouts. However it is not
enough. Once arrived at the roundabout, drivers need to
choose the appropriate direction, otherwise they would
crash one with the other. To do this they need to know
the convention or norm in force. From the perspective of
this paper, this entails that some deontic mediators are rep-
resented in the agent’s mind. For example the agent is
‘obliged’ to turn right. Obligations are considered as men-
tal constraints that limit available actions.
It is part of our research program the grounding of the
deontic dimension in the physical one. We consider obliga-
tions, prohibitions, permissions and the like as mental con-
straints and opportunities. It is out of the scope of this
paper to specify how these mediators arise in the agent’s
mind and how they are represented.25
Proposition 5. There exist some artifacts such that the set of
cognitive opportunities and constraints (deontic mediatiors)
are necessary and sufficient conditions to enable a single-
agent coordinated action.
Finally, the artifact can be completely dematerialized as
in social conventions and norms. A social convention to
drive on the left or on the right exists independently of
any material coordination artifact and can evolve by itself
and into a social norm (Lewis, 1969; Castelfranchi et al.,
2003). The convention or the set of conventions is for us
a case of normative system that regulate the actions of
the collective (everybody drives on the same line) by regu-
lating the single actions of the individuals (drive on the
left).
This features of conventions make them similar to pro-
cedures or scripts. While in the case of procedures and
scripts one course of action is preferred to possible others
and is used as a means to coordinating the actions, the
specificity of conventions lies in their arbitrariness. When
a convention is in place a specific course of action is
expected, but there exists at least another equally good to
achieve the goal (Lewis, 1969).
5.5. Institutions as coordination artifacts
Institutions are artifacts that are oriented to achieve
coordination in a peculiar way.
Proposition 6. There exist some artifacts such that the
recognition of their use by an agent and the set of cognitive
opportunities and constraints (deontic mediators) are neces-
sary and sufficient conditions to enable a multiagent coor-
dinated action.
This is the case of institutions as a specific kind of coor-
dination artifacts that make them different both from mate-
rial artifacts and from conventions.
It is a common property of economic analysis of institu-
tions to consider conventions and institutions as identical
phenomena. Traditional and assumed definitions of an
institution as ‘‘the laws, rules and conventions that give a
durable structure to social interactions in members of a
population’’ (Bowles, 2004) tend to reduce institutions to
conventions. The emergence of the convention of driving
on the left or the set of conventions that regulate traffic
in a community does not make driving on the left an
institution.26
The main difference between conventions and institu-
tions lies in the fact that while a convention enables a
single-agent action that contributes to a multiagent coordi-
nation (when acting according to a convention, the agent
has the power of acting in coordination with others), an
institution provides individual agents with the special con-
ventional power of doing an action which is a multi-agent
coordinated action.
25 Artifacts and traces of actions can also be used to communicate such
mental constraints and opportunities. Consider the case of a broom that
hinders the entrance of a toilet. The broom is put there on purpose to
create an impediment for people who wants to enter. By understanding
this intention, a person can understand also the implicit imperative of the
cleaner not to enter. In this way a double constraint is created and one is
complementary to the other. The broom by itself would be an easily
removable obstacle.
26 Actually there is a continuum the goes from conventions, to practices
and to institutions (Tuomela, 2002). And more importantly, convention in
Lewis’ sense can evolve in institutions. ‘Taking precedence’ is an example
of institutional action that evolves from a ‘driving on the left’ convention.
In order to outline the basic mechanism of institutions, here we are more
concerned in the opposition of the two extremes.
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This feature that seems to be absurd, is obtained through
a cognitive mediation that is absent in mere conventions.
5.6. Institutional roles as coordination artifacts
Both ‘property’ and ‘marriage’ in a society coordinate
actions, viz. the access to scarce resources. This is their ulti-
mate function. As we have seen in Section 3, the coordina-
tion of actions of the involved participants is a necessary
condition to achieve the result of an institutional action
A. Their coordination is both a prerequisite and a conse-
quence of institutional actions. However in the end of that
section, we have also acknowledged that to get the institu-
tional machinery off the ground it is necessary that the
involved participants believe that there is one agent in the
group that has the power of doing the institutional action
(subjective power). This is again a coordination problem.
There should be a mechanism to coordinate the assignment
of conventional power. In this section, we have also claimed
that institutions are coordinating artifacts. In fact, they are
a complex artifact that should be analyzed as a functional
structure whose different parts contribute to the overall
coordinating function. Also a simple artifact as a hammer
is composed of different parts (the handle, the stick, the
head) that contribute to the function of hitting.
What are the parts in the institutions that contribute to
the coordinating function? What is used and by whom in
an institution?
In Section 1, we have claimed that institutional actions,
like paying, are prior to institutional artifacts, like money.
A theory of institutions should provide an adequate analy-
sis of the role of artifacts such as money, scepters, signa-
tures and the like.
Institutional artifacts are results of institutional actions
that are done to be used by agents. For the time being,
our claim is that such external artifacts achieve their coor-
dinating function by interacting with the most basic coor-
dination artifacts of all.
Our working hypothesis is that such basic coordination
artifact is the institutional role that the agent is playing (the
priest, the owner) and that the collectivity, even if unaware
of doing this, is using for coordinating their physical actions.
Institutional roles enable actions that otherwise would
not be possible. From this respect the role of ‘owner’ is
an artifact similar to the ‘knife’. By using the knife an agent
acquire the power of cutting. Similarly, once an agent has
the role of ‘owner’, he is somehow empowered to exclude
all the others from the use of a resource.
But who exactly is using this role is not so trivial. Is the
agent that does the action of excluding all the others or is
the community doing it?
As we have seen in Section 2, there is a possible mis-
attribution that is evident when we say that the goal of
the knife is to cut. We are implicitly acknowledging to the
artifact the power of the action that only the agent is able
to execute. We argue that a similar mis-attribution is in
place when we acknowledge to an agent playing an
institutional role the power of doing the action. As we have
seen, institutional actions are always collective actions
whose power is always a co-power of all the agents. As in
the case of usual artifact (see Section 2.3), the appropriate
actions of an agent playing that role are part of the concept.
Turning back to the Searlian constitutive rules, we
have argued that they can be used to describe a recogni-
tion process which is also a process of artificial empow-
erment. Searle uses the ‘‘X counts as Y in C’’ formulas
both to describe the fact that ‘‘a certain agent counts
as a priest’’ and the fact that ‘‘a certain movement of
body counts as a baptizing’’. We agree that there is an
artificial empowerment in both situations but we consider
the former as a more basic one. When the involved par-
ticipants recognize (seeing and treating as) the ‘priest’ in
Paul, the output of this process is the belief (and the
actual fact from there on) that Paul has the power of
marrying John and Mary. This belief is then necessary
to recognize in his vehicle action the institutional
supra-action A. The cognitive and behavioral mediation
of the institutional action is also an artificial empower-
ment. The vehicle action could not achieve the intended
result without this artificial mediation.
5.7. A (preliminary) solution to the puzzle of unintentional
institutional action
If we accept the fact that considering ‘an agent’ as ‘an
agent in a role’ is a sufficient condition for the group of
agents to assign conventional powers to one of them, then
a possible solution to the puzzle of unintentional institu-
tional actions seems to be within reach.
We can in fact claim that when an agent is playing an
institutional role the group of involved agent in the com-
munity assumes he has the relevant conventional powers.
The basic mechanism can get off the ground in the moment
that there exists a community that shares the Cognitive
Type of an institutional role. It is our hypothesis the
institutional roles are macro-concepts that group a set of
institutional actions.
Consequently, if a role is built (the concept is formed
and shared) including intentional vehicle actions or vehicle
events as vehicles of institutional actions then the power of
doing an institutional action is created. In such strange
cases, the behavioral mediation that is done by the collec-
tive now (treating Mary as an assassin), completes the
supra-action she has done maybe years before (killing her
husband John).
It is also worth mentioning that institutional actions
being always goal oriented (there always is a coordination
function) are actions under every respect.
6. Conclusions
This paper has tried to provide a conceptual analysis of
how institutions conduct their activities viz. coordinate the
agents’ activities.
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In form of a conclusion is useful to summarize the main
theses that we have defended:
(1) the process of institutionalization of human behavior
is a process of artificial empowerment;
(2) an institutional action is a socially mediated multi-
agent action;
(3) while an institutional action is a socially mediated
multi-agent action (viz. a collaborative activity) it is
not executed on the basis of a shared plan;
(4) an institutional action is regarded as a single agent
action and the agent believes he has the power of
doing the action;
(5) an institutional action has artificial effects that are
added by the collectivity so that the intended result
is obtained;
(6) the main result that the action is achieving is the
coordination result. This result is not necessary
intended but is the ultimate end of the action
(function);
(7) the institutional action can be done intentionally or
not by the agent but it is a real action relative to
the function of coordinating the collectivity;
(8) the institutional role is the artifact that assign the
conventional power to the agent. The collectivity by
recognizing the role and by acting accordingly enable
the institutional actions because they wrongly attri-
bute the power of the action to the role. This is
why having the role is having the power;
(9) the conventional power is always a power of coordi-
nating a collectivity of agents.
Hopefully, this conceptual apparatus will be useful in
analyzing the way in which institutions act by means of
their participants. However a different question is how
and why a specific institution has emerged in the first place
and by which specific process it is temporally maintained.
Our conceptual apparatus will be used to approach these
questions in further work.
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